Decomposing the sources of SARS-CoV-2 fitness variation in the United States (preprint)

The fitness of a pathogen is composite phenotype determined by many different factors influencing growth rates both within and between hosts. Determining what factors shape fitness at the host population-level is especially challenging because both intrinsic factors like pathogen genetics and extrinsic factors such as host behaviour influence between-host transmission potential. These challenges have been highlighted by controversy surrounding the population-level fitness effects of mutations in the SARS-CoV-2 genome and their relative importance when compared against non-genetic factors shaping transmission dynamics. Building upon phylodynamic birth-death models, we develop a new framework to learn how hundreds of genetic and non-genetic factors have shaped the fitness of SARS-CoV-2. We estimate the fitness effects of all amino acid variants and several structural variants that have circulated in the United States between February and September 2020 from viral phylogenies. We also estimate how much fitness variation among pathogen lineages is attributable to genetic versus non-genetic factors such as spatial heterogeneity in transmission rates. Up to September 2020, most fitness variation between lineages can be explained by background spatial heterogeneity in transmission rates across geographic regions. Furthermore, no genetic variant including the Spike D614G mutation has had a significant effect on population-level fitness. Instead, the rapid increase in the frequency of the Spike D614G can be explained by the variant having a spatial transmission advantage due to first establishing in regions with higher transmission rates during the earliest stages of the pandemic.

The Potential for SARS-CoV-2 to Evade Both Natural and Vaccine-induced Immunity (preprint)

SARS-CoV-2 attaches to the surface of susceptible cells through extensive interactions between the receptor binding domain (RBD) of its spike protein and angiotensin converting enzyme type 2 (ACE2) anchored in cell membranes. To investigate whether naturally occurring mutations in the spike protein are able to prevent antibody binding, yet while maintaining the ability to bind ACE2 and viral infectivity, mutations in the spike protein identified in cases of human infection were mapped to the crystallographically-determined interfaces between the spike protein and ACE2 (PDB entry 6M0J), antibody CC12.1 (PDB entry 6XC2), and antibody P2B-2F6 (PDB entry 7BWJ). Both antibody binding interfaces partially overlap with the ACE2 binding interface. Among 16 mutations that map to the RBD:CC12.1 interface, 11 are likely to disrupt CC12.1 binding but not ACE2 binding. Among 12 mutations that map to the RBD:P2B-2F6 interface, 8 are likely to disrupt P2B-2F6 binding but not ACE2 binding. As expected, none of the mutations observed to date appear likely to disrupt the RBD:ACE2 interface. We conclude that SARS-CoV-2 with mutated forms of the spike protein may retain the ability to bind ACE2 while evading recognition by antibodies that arise in response to the original wild-type form of the spike protein. It seems likely that immune evasion will be possible regardless of whether the spike protein was encountered in the form of infectious virus, or as the immunogen in a vaccine. Therefore, it also seems likely that reinfection with a variant strain of SARS-CoV-2 may occur among people who recover from Covid-19, and that vaccines with the ability to generate antibodies against multiple variant forms of the spike protein will be necessary to protect against variant forms of SARS-CoV-2 that are already circulating in the human population.